the social contract and the first and second discourses

(110-111, and there are several other remarks to the same effect) The three forms of freedom that he discussed are a kind of happy consequence of the terms of the social pact but they are neither the citizens' motivation for entering the contract nor the purpose of the contract itself. For instance, he writes in the Conclusion (Chapter 6)Īnother important feature of his theory of freedom is that the people he described entering the social pact do not do so in order to be free, at least not in the usual sense of the word…. However, there is something slightly odd in how this claim comports with several of the remarks Simpson makes later on in the book. Simpson says that the central topic of The Social Contract is 'how people might construct a genuinely free political society' (ix, again) and it is plausible to hold that this is so given Rousseau's own famous formulation of the 'problem' to which the social contract is the solution, which says that the members of the political community must 'remain as free as before'. He adds that he is 'not primarily concerned with the metaphysical problem of freewill' (ix) though he does discuss Rousseau's engagement with this on a couple of occasions with some incisiveness and clarity, despite not pursuing the matter to its end (see 61-6 and 98-100). These four are: natural freedom, civil freedom, democratic freedom and moral freedom, and Simpson sets out to consider, as noted, the nature of each of these, how they stand to one another and to the social contact itself.

Simpson contends that there are to be found in The Social Contract 'four different kinds of freedom that are relevant to politics, yet the nature of each, their relative importance, and their relationship to the social contract after which the work was named are all far from clear' (1). So the focus is even tighter, although from time to time, and for good reason, Simpson has to look outside The Social Contract to explain or develop his points, most particularly to the Second Discourse (on Inequality) and to Emile, though one or two other pieces of Rousseau's also receive glancing mention. The title of the book slightly misleads although it is called Rousseau's Theory of Freedom its purpose, Simpson says, is in fact 'to explain the theory of freedom developed by Jean-Jacques Rousseau in his work The Social Contract ' (ix).

Simpson's book certainly bears this out, even though it is comparatively brief. It is still fairly uncommon for book length critical assessments of Rousseau's work to concentrate on one theme or notion in his thinking rather than taking a broader canvas, but the gains in detail of assessment and depth of analysis are often significant.

The social contract and the first and second discourses